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Credit risk management and financial stability
The International Banking and Finance Institute (IBFI) of the Banque de France organised its sixth
International Monetary Seminar on the subject of “Credit risk management and financial stability” from 7
to 11 June 2004.  This seminar, opened by Governor Christian Noyer, brought together forty five
representatives from central banks in developed and emerging countries and from international
organisations (such as the Bank for International Settlements and the European Central Bank), as well as
twenty speakers from central banks, international institutions and the private sector.
The first two days of the seminar were devoted to conferences on:
• risks and sources of macro-financial vulnerability, the latest developments on credit risk transfer markets
and the presentation of the findings of the cross-sectoral survey on credit derivatives in France;
• the technical, financial and legal aspects of securitisation and credit risk management;
• the presentation of the French and European experiences with respect to the role of central banks in
rating companies and their contribution to financial stability;
• bad debts and their impact on financial stability (case of Japan);
• Basel II, a prudential framework which better reflects credit risk, and the effect of ratings on market dynamics;
• lastly, the macro-financial consequences of risk transfers from the perspective of financial
interdependence.
Over the next two days, participants attended two workshops on the subjects of “Basel II, credit risk
provisioning and accounting standards” and “Credit risk management and its macro-financial
consequences”. These gave rise to intensive and fruitful  discussions on the following four points:
1. identification of the sources of risk or financial vulnerability
2. credit risk assessment
3. credit risk management
4. implications for economic policy
This article summarises the debates held in the workshops and the round table discussions on the last day.116 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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1| WHAT ARE THE MAIN SOURCES
OF RISK OR FINANCIAL
VULNERABILITY?
A consensus rapidly emerged on the five principal
sources of risk and vulnerability. The first category
comprises macroeconomic risks and the four others
are more related to credit risk:
• macroeconomic risk, which reflects a country’s
degree of exposure to external shocks, such as rising
oil or commodity prices, the persistence of
macro-financial imbalances, in particular in the
United States, or the risk of a sudden interest rate
increase;
• rapid, if not excessive, credit growth — in particular
mortgages — in some countries where economic
agents also appear to be heavily indebted;
•  the pricing of risk; according to several
participants, markets appear to underestimate credit
risk, especially if one looks at the current very low
level of credit spreads;
• the possible concentration of risk in a limited
number of institutions or sectors — such as
insurance — to which a large share of credit risk
could have been transferred via credit derivatives;
• the growing interdependence between the
different financial sectors.
2| HOW TO ASSESS CREDIT RISK?
The issue of credit risk, as tackled in workshop
No. 1, is an area in which accounting standard-setters
and prudential supervisors  have taken a great
interest. Indeed, the new IAS/IFRS1 standards aim
to improve the quality of information provided to
investors by promoting the instant valuation of firms
at market prices.  This approach tends, however, to
relativise the principle of prudence which underpins
the approach adopted by regulators: the new Basel II
framework is more far-reaching and forward-looking
insofar as all of the risks to which banks are exposed
must be taken into account when their risk profile
is being drawn up.
Assessing credit risk first involves collecting
statistical data and compiling a number of indicators
of financial soundness, in accordance with the IMF
approach. In workshop No.2, it was shown that there
were clear synergies and similarities between the
international community’s willingness to assess
risks at a global level and the implementation of
the IASB’s international accounting standards on the
one hand, and the principles underlying the work
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) on the other.
Participants looked at how these approaches could
be applied to their specific environment, especially
in cases where data are relatively scarce or unreliable.
However sophisticated the instruments and models
may be, assessing credit risk can come up against a
problem of economic data availability. As regards
prudential and accounting issues, the issue to be
addressed is that of the scope and timetable for the
application of IAS/IFRS and Basel II standards to
emerging countries and small credit institutions.
Lastly, the results of the stress tests presented in both
workshops highlighted the key role played by credit
growth as a leading indicator of financial
vulnerability.
3| HOW TO MANAGE CREDIT RISK?
Participants analysed the different risk management
techniques by taking a look at the following two
aspects: the emergence of a risk culture and the
prevention of risk by building up regulatory capital
in proportion to the level of risk exposure of each
credit institution.
Pillar 1 of the new Basel II framework provides
banks with several options for calculating their
capital requirements relative to their credit risk
and their operational risk. The most innovative
one is the possibility that banks have been given
of using — under the control of the supervisory
authorities — their internal assessment systems.
Because calibrating these models tends to come
up against the problem of the reliability and
availability of data in some emerging economies,
the Basel Committee has proposed a simplified
standardised approach designed specifically for
these economies.
1 IAS: International Accounting Standards
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The development of credit derivatives markets is taken
into account when drawing up standards that better
capture risk and recognising the most advanced
techniques at the prudential level. The following
conclusions were drawn from the presentation of the
results of the survey conducted under the aegis of the
ESCB Banking Supervision Committee: the liquidity
of credit derivatives markets has increased sharply,
and, contrary to expectations, the transfer of credit
risk to insurance companies has marked time. In
Europe, activity thus appears to be principally
concentrated in the banking sector. The most
standardised instruments, such as credit default swaps
(CDSs) account for the lion’s share of transactions.  As
yet, credit risk transfer activities do not appear to have
substantially impacted European banks’ provisioning
needs over the last business cycle. However, a few
aspects remain unclear. They relate to the amounts
actually transferred and the complexity of some of
the instruments used, such as the CDOs of CDOs
(Collateralised Debt Obligations), which seem
particularly obscure.
Participants also commented on the decision taken
by the Basel Committee in October 2003 to calibrate
capital requirements against unexpected losses. This
mechanism could have penalised banks that make
greater provisions for their expected losses and
resort more to dynamic provisioning. In order to
prevent this undesirable effect from arising, excess
provision amounts are to be integrated into banks’
additional capital up to a certain limit, while any
shortfall of provision amounts compared with
expected losses is to be deducted from banks’ own
funds, up to 50% from their core capital (Tier 1)
and 50% from their additional capital (Tier 2).
4| ECONOMIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The complexity of the credit risk transfer
instruments and the possible existence of
information asymmetries on credit markets
highlight the importance of providing economic
agents with sufficient information in order to
ensure financial stability.
Providing information is precisely one of the
principal levers used by central banks, in particular
through the publication of financial stability reviews.
This, however, raises several questions (regarding
the target audience of these publications and their
needs or the risk of generating self-fulfilling financial
crises), in particular in the case of central banks
that are not responsible for the control and
supervision of credit institutions.
As regards the new credit risk transfer instruments,
such as credit derivatives, the following issues were
discussed: the need to test the robustness of financial
systems in times of crisis, the necessity of
strengthening market infrastructures and the
resilience of financial systems following a shock.
Participants also brought up the questions of
transparency and the need to inform the market by
providing it with information on the advantages and
disadvantages of credit risk transfer instruments.
As regards accounting and prudential standards, the
question of the link between the future accounting
standards drawn up by the IASB and the new capital
adequacy framework was brought up.  Almost all of
the standards drafted by the IASB were adopted by
the European Commission in 2003 with the exception,
for the time being, of Standards IAS 32 and 39, which
are particularly important for the banking and financial
sectors. It seems to be desirable to take advantage of
this delay to strengthen the coherence between certain
provisions in IAS 39 and the prudential objectives set
by the Basel Committee. Participants were particularly
concerned about the accounting treatment of
macro-hedging transactions and the provisioning for
expected losses in a credit portfolio.
By way of conclusion, the workshops provided a few
answers to the questions raised by Governor
Christian Noyer in his opening speech.
“Do credit risk transfers – irrespective of their technical
details – result at the macro-financial level in the pooling
of risks or in the concentration of these risks with certain
market participants?  In the latter case, are market
participants able to control these risks and manage them
with greater accuracy?”
The workshop conclusions are rather positive. Risk
transfer activities seem to be concentrated in the
banking sector. Concerns about the transfer of risk to
the insurance sector appear to have eased. Risk transfer
activities clearly appear to correspond to a
diversification of risks and have resulted in increasing
market liquidity. From this point of view, credit
derivatives complete financial markets and promote
a better allocation of risks. They thus contribute to
financial stability.118 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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“For a certain number of countries present in this
audience, under what conditions would the
generalisation of best practices with respect to credit
risk management, as defined in Basel II, enhance
financial stability? The same question arises with regard
to the harmonisation of international standards.”
It emerges from the discussions that the first
precondition is the necessary harmonisation of
accounting standards, as defined by the IASB, and
prudential standards, as advocated by the Basel
Committee. A second precondition concerns the
implementation procedures and the scope of
application of these standards. A pragmatic and
flexible approach seems necessary to adapt these
standards to local needs and to small credit
institutions.
“Is the nature of bank intermediation undergoing change
as a result of the boom in credit derivatives?”
It seems that we lack sufficient hindsight to establish
whether or not the boom in credit derivatives has
altered banks’ lending behaviour. One commonly
held fear is that banks may let up on their screening
and monitoring activities given that they now have
the opportunity of transferring credit risk.  A rather
reassuring reply was put forward. The ECB survey
of credit risk transfers by EU banks and the French
market survey on the same subject (published in
the June 2004 issue of the Financial Stability Review
of the Banque de France) show that protection
buyers i.e. banks that transfer their risks place
particular emphasis on the reputational risk to which
they are exposed i.e. the risk stemming from the
fact that the underlying assets that they have
transferred to other credit institutions are not
sufficiently performing.  This suggests that banks
have not relaxed their vigilance as regards credit
risk control. However, regarding accounting
standards, questions may be raised over their
possible impact on banks’ customer relations, given
that banks could be prone to transfer their interest
rate or liquidity risk to their clients in order to
prevent even greater volatility in their financial
statements.
5| ROUND TABLE
During the round table debate led by
Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn, Director General,
Economics and International Relations, six speakers
discussed the issue of the implications for markets
and supervisory authorities of the boom in credit risk
management instruments in terms of financial
stability:
•  Danièle Nouy, Secretary General of the
Commission bancaire;
• Philippe Trainar, Director of Economic and
Financial Affairs of the French Federation of
Insurance Companies;
• Jan  Brockmeijer,  Executive  Director  for
Supervision at the Nederlandsche Bank;
• Hans-Helmut Kotz, member of the Executive
Board of the Bundesbank;
• Claudio Borio, Head of Research and Policy
Analysis at the Bank for International Settlements;
• Peter Praet, Director of the National Bank of
Belgium, who summarised the debates.
Danièle Nouy put forward eight reasons why Basel II
and the development of the internal ratings-based
approach could contribute to financial stability: a
finer and more accurate measurement of credit risk
using the internal ratings-based approach, which
corresponds to the best practices of the best managed
banks; less regulatory arbitrage because this
approach brings regulatory capital closer to
economic capital; better credit risk management,
given that the new capital adequacy framework will
result in a more adequate pricing of risks; the good
coverage of expected losses by provisions (Madrid
compromise – October 2003); an individualised
monitoring of risk profiles for each bank; better
financial communication, as Pillar 3 strengthens
market discipline and underpins the efforts made by
supervisory authorities; the generalised use of stress
tests to reduce the possible pro-cyclicality of the new
accord and, lastly, an improved dialogue between
supervisors and banks.
Philippe Trainar went on to give an overview of
credit risk management in the insurance and
reinsurance sectors, whose market share accounts
for roughly one third of the sale of protection. This
usually takes the form of structured finance products
such as CDOs. While considering the possible
sources of systemic risk specific to this sector, he
first referred to the strong concentration of activitiesBanque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 119
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on a small number of insurers and reinsurers. There
is also a risk of contagion linked to the traditional
mechanisms of cessions and retrocessions.
Engaging in regulatory arbitrage and bypassing
regulations constitutes a third source of risk. Indeed,
a large proportion of insurers and reinsurers on the
market are not subject to any regulation. This holds
true in the case of the “Bermudians”. At this stage,
however, nothing seems to suggest that these risks
are likely to become systemic. Furthermore, the
credit risk underwritten by insurers is usually of a
very high quality.
Jan Brockmeijer brought up the issue of the close
relationship between credit risk and financial
stability. According to a recent study by the
Joint Forum, the insurance sector suffers from a lack
of information on the distribution of credit exposures
as well as on the different risk profiles. As in the
banking industry, regulatory developments play an
important role. In 2007, insurance companies in the
European Union will be subject to a new solvency
regime (Solvency II) based on a risk sensitive capital
criterion.  Like Basel II, it is underpinned by a three
pillar approach: standardised capital requirements,
supervisory requirements and financial disclosure.
Hans-Helmut Kotz broached the issue of external
ratings as a public good by asking five questions: Why
ratings? What instruments are used? What is the
performance and real (or latent) function of these
ratings? Is there a case for government intervention?
There is a need for rating agencies because the market
is imperfect (portfolio indivisibilities, transaction costs,
information asymmetries, etc.); rating agencies
themselves evolve in an oligopolistic market
(economies of scale). They do not disclose enough
information on the assessment models they use,
although they claim to be exhaustive in their
analysis.These assessments may therefore sometimes
be deemed opaque and based on experts’ opinions.
Their relative performance in terms of credit risk
assessment compared with that of other approaches
(banks, markets, interest rate spreads, fundamentals)
is not flawless. Of course, it is worth pointing out that
no instrument or institution is infallible, which implies
(a) the need to question any pretence of knowledge
and consequently (b) the need to have a diversity of
assessments. However, rating agencies tend to guide
the perception of markets by means of a number of
common factors by focusing not only on financial
conditions but also on business plans and the
appropriateness of macroeconomic policies. The
structure of the credit assessment market (a narrow
oligopoly) and the intrinsic nature of assessments
therefore seem to suggest that there is a case for
government intervention in the form of regulations
or the public provision of ratings as in the case of
company observatories, or a combination of both
solutions.
Claudio Borio covered the relationship between credit
risk, financial cycles and financial stability. Financial
instability stems from the self-reinforcing mechanism
whereby asset prices increase, financing constraints
are relaxed and credit rises excessively. This
phenomenon arises partly as a result of an inadequate
perception or an inadequate assessment of risk
incurred, in particular credit risk. Based on his work
at the BIS, Claudio Borio recalled that it was possible
to predict episodes of financial turbulence using a
limited number of macroeconomic variables.
As regards regulations, looking at an appropriate time
horizon should help to reduce some intrinsically
pro-cyclical characteristics of economic
agents’ behaviour, such as risk assessment for
example. In addition, risk assessment systems are
affected by the pro-cyclicality of appetite for risk,
which is in fact a key determinant of financial asset
prices.  As regards provisioning, it would be necessary
to take account of the residual maturity of the
instrument, and as regards capital adequacy, the
necessary time horizon to adjust the amount of
regulatory capital. Lastly, greater harmonisation
between the accounting and regulatory approaches
would be desirable.
Peter Praet stressed that striving for financial stability
should go hand in hand with developing efficient
markets through appropriate financial policies and
regulations.  Although the current boom in market
financing compels us to rethink certain mechanisms,
such as the coordination between bondholders, it is
not more volatile and unstable than intermediated
financing. Peter Praet also pointed out that credit risk
management is not only the realm of experts, but it is
also a question of incentives to take and manage risks.
He concluded by stressing that risk management
should not be purely a question of financial
engineering, but it should also integrate, in addition
to the human factor, issues which are crucial for the
smooth running of companies and capital markets,
such as the design of organisations, incentives and
governance-related issues.